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Mediating between custom and code
Dâr al-Salâm, an NGO for tribal arbitration in Sanca’
Laila al-Zwaini
I would like to express my gratitude to Baudouin Dupret for many thoughtprovoking discussions
and his constant support. I also wish to acknowledge cAbd al-Nâsir al-Muwaddac for sharing his
insider’s view and companionship during my fieldwork for this article in Sancâ’. To Paul Dresch I
owe special thanks for his careful reading of this paper, from which I benefited a great deal.
Mariëtte van Beek, at a crucial moment, helped me to refocus my argument. Financial support and
hospitality during my fieldwork in April–May 2001 was provided by the Centre Français
d’Archéologie et de Sciences Sociales de Sancâ’ (CEFAS), for which I especially thank its director at
the time, François Burgat. And last but not least, I am indebted to Léon Buskens for his analytical
comments and interest in my work over many years.
1 In the last forty years, three major events have been crucial in forming a modern state in
Yemen: the Revolution of 1962 in North Yemen, the Revolution of 1967 in South Yemen,
and the unification of the two Yemens in 1990. The first event marked the end of Imamic
sovereignty over North Yemen and incited the founding of the country as a republic.
South Yemen followed in 1967 by regaining its independence from Britain. On 22 May
1990 the two Yemens were merged into a single state.1
2 In its unified form, the Yemeni state reshaped its institutions to fulfil an old ambition to
complement territorial supremacy with effective legal and societal control.2 Important
control mechanisms are its codified laws (sg. qânûn) and an organised court system for
the administration of justice. However, the Yemeni state is not a strong one. It has two
major rivals in its battle for control, two sociopolitical and normative power bases that
have remained distinctive throughout the transitory process, especially in the northern
regions. These are the Islamic establishment (and recently also the Islamist movement),
whose major contention with the state concerns the control over sharîca, and the tribes,
whose internal structures and conduct continue to be dominated by tribal customs (sg. c
urf qabalî). 
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3 Although these two rival centres of power present continual challenges to state authority,
there are both clear and less clear indications of accommodation and cooperation among
the respective members of this power triangle. When the state interacts with societal
actors, it often adapts its strategies and even makes concessions to its own laws, in order
to  reconcile  national  ambitions  with  realities  on  the  ground.  Conversely,  tribal  and
Islamic actors begin to discover that the newly developing “civil society” can be used to
regain their authority under a modern format.3
4 This  article  examines  Dâr  al-Salâm  li-l-Tahkîm  in  Sancâ’  (The  House  of  Peace  for
Arbitration, hereafter referred to by its local name, Dâr al-Salâm) as an illustration of an
organisation that explores the boundaries between curf, sharîca and qânûn, and between
tribal and civil society.4
5 Before going into further detail, a brief comment should be made about the sources used
for this study. Initially, I intended to collect decisions from arbitrations carried out by Dâr
al-Salâm, in order to illustrate how the interrelationship between sharîca, curf and qânûn
works in practice. Although I was received with hospitality, two factors complicated this
objective:  the  first  is  that  the  spokesmen  of  the  organisation,  as  managers  of  an
enterprise seeking funding, were unable to see my interest in them as merely academic,
and provided information as if I were a potential donor. The printed materials supplied to
me therefore  consisted mostly  of  promotional  materials  (leaflets,  letters,  statements,
poems,  stickers),  numerous  newspaper  reports,  photos  and  arbitration  decisions
rendered in simplified language. The few decisions that I obtained details about were
mostly incomplete, or else less relevant for my purpose. To my more probing questions
about specific proceedings,  persons and norms,  I  found the responses often idealistic
rather  than realistic.  Second,  tribal  customs  do  not  allow a  woman to  attend  tribal
arbitration or mediation proceedings, and even the organisation’s own presentation as a
“civil” NGO has not (yet) changed this tradition. 
6 These unsolicited materials, I realised, might not provide sufficient details for a study on
the actual workings of Dâr al-Salâm in specific cases, but were appropriate to a study on
Dâr al-Salâm as a phenomenon in its own right. Therefore, the present article focuses on
the written and spoken narratives used by different actors and how they perceive the
structure, objectives and functioning of Dâr al-Salâm. These personalised accounts will
form the  leading  motif  for  a  more  contextual  elaboration  on  their  social,  legal  and
discursive connotations. 
7 The first section outlines the prelude to the creation of Dâr al-Salâm, and introduces its
instigator and main actor, cAbd al-Rahmân al-Marwanî. The second section describes the
circumstances under which Dâr al-Salâm was created, and presents its agenda. The third
section shows how Dâr al-Salâm positions itself at the “crossroads of justice” by using a
pluralist  discourse  in  order  to  legitimise  its  status  and activities.  The fourth section
discusses  the  particular  composition  of  its  members  from  Islamic,  tribal  and  legal
backgrounds. The fifth section extracts from some actual arbitration cases those aspects
that illustrate how Dâr al-Salâm mediates between different norms and actors. The sixth
and final section takes note of the Law of Arbitration as an instrument used both by the
state and Dâr al-Salâm to regulate tribal arbitration under a new format. 
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The prelude to Dâr al-Salâm 
8 Symbolically  or  not,  a  crossroad marked the location of  Dâr  al-Salâm in the eastern
quarter  of  Sancâ’.5 It  was  on the  top floor  of  a  shared concrete  building,  up a  dark
staircase that led the visitor into a small hallway. The walls were covered with colour
photos of earlier guests: Yemeni notables, foreign diplomats, international organisations,
academic researchers and the like.  Another wall  was decorated with the calligraphed
names of members and supporters of Dâr al-Salâm, and with Qur’ânic verses invoking
justice and arbitration. Only the smallest room was furnished as an office, with an old
computer, a typewriter, some chairs for visitors and several boxes in a corner containing
the archives.  All  the  other  rooms were arranged as  smaller  or  bigger  qât-chambers,
rectangular rooms with a view, with carpets on the floor and cushions and armrests lined
up against  the walls  and windows.  Here is  where,  traditionally  and presently,  actual
business is done in Yemen. 
9 It took many qât-chews over several years to realise the idea of creating an institute for
arbitration on the basis of sharîca, qânûn and curf.6 The first initiative, started in 1993 by a
group of seven men – tribesmen, Islamic judges and lawyers – led to the establishment in
1997,  at  least  on  paper,  of  Al-Dâr  al-Yamaniyya  li-l-Tahkîm (The  Yemeni  House  for
Arbitration). One of them, Qâdî Muhammad al-Sudumî, was a judge in a primary court in
Sancâ’ who also acted as an arbitrator in tribal disputes, being a recognised authority on
tribal laws and customs. His position as a judge grew controversial when it became known
that he practised tribal procedures inside the court building as well.7 The regular traffic
of armed tribesmen and slaughter animals used for tribal reconciliation, deterred lawyers
and citizens seeking justice from entering his court. Al-Sudumî was eventually dismissed
as  a  judge  and,  for  reasons  unknown,  vanished  from  sight  altogether.  With  him
disappeared the first House of Arbitration. 
10 Although it could not be exactly determined whether the second initiative, Dâr al-Salâm,
rose from the ruins of the first, its list of core members does include names of some of the
earlier members. However, the person who would become the central figure of Dâr al-
Salâm, the spirited cAbd al-Rahmân Yahyâ al-Marwanî, had not been part of the first Dâr.
Whereas Qâdi Al-Sudumî used to buttress his position as an arbitrator with a written
ijâza, a traditional certificate listing his educational trajectory and achievements, and a
long list of signatures from tribal shaykhs acknowledging him as an authority on tribal
law, Al-Marwanî introduces himself with a modern curriculum vitae.8 In it, we read that
Al-Marwanî is a Sûfî Muslim educated in “something equivalent to (mucâdalat) sharîca and
qânûn9, a “muhâmî (lawyer), even before the issuance of the Law of Advocacy”10, and that
he was previously a high-ranking army officer, until his voluntarily retirement. Inspired
by his teacher, Ahmad Muhammad Zabâra, the late Grand Muftî of Yemen, he studied the
holy texts of different religions, and publications calling for peace and tolerance between
people from different creeds. 
11 The CV goes on to say that Al-Marwanî, as a protagonist in respecting human beings and
their rights, aims at reviving Yemeni customary norms, and spreading a culture of peace
and democracy among the tribes by making arbitration an institutionalised practice. In
the field of qânûn he acts as a pro bono legal counsellor for women and disadvantaged
individuals,  and  has  personally  solved  many  civil  cases  by  voluntary  arbitration,  an
achievement that led the press to give him the honorific title qâdîcurfî (customary judge)
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or al-qâdî curf11 (“custom-judge” or, in Al-Marwanî’s own translation, “Mr. Arbitrator”), a
title he carries with pride. 
12 It is relevant to know that the title qâdî has a threefold meaning in Yemen: Islamic judge
(a sharîca term), court judge (a term protected by qânûn), and someone belonging to the
social class of qâdîs, who are classified immediately after the sayyids (descendants of the
Prophet). In this latter sense, the title is hereditary. To avoid misunderstanding, the title
hâkim is often used for a court judge. Muhakkam is the usual term for arbitrator, and
muhakkamcurfî denotes a customary arbitrator. The invented term, qâdîcurfî, seems to be a
linguistic device accommodating both code and custom. 
13 Apart  from  arbitration  and  legal  aid,  Al-Marwanî  uses  various  media  as  important
vehicles for promoting his aims. He contributed to several legal awareness programmes
on Yemeni TV and radio, such as the series “Your Legal Consultant”, “An Overview of
Law” – on how to use the Law of Arbitration to solve conflicts – and “Face to Face”, about
the phenomenon of blood revenge (tha’r) and how to suppress it. He often approaches
Yemeni and Arab newspapers to promote the activities of Dâr al-Salâm, and organises
awareness campaigns among the tribes12. 
14 By institutionalising his personal aspirations of “spreading peace and justice” through
the creation of Dâr al-Salâm, Al-Marwanî contributes to the bridging of tribal and civil
society in Yemen, and also of “traditional” normative systems (sharîca and curf) and state-
issued law (qânûn). These processes of institutionalisation and bridging are a recurrent
theme in the following sections. 
 
The establishment of Dâr al-Salâm 
15 The formal launch of Dâr al-Salâm was on 1 October 1998, although no contract, official
registration, or regulatory statutes were provided13. Al-Marwanî had initiated the process
by organising a tafkîr qât, a qât-brainstorming session, after which he went around many
other maqyals (qât-gatherings) of notables from tribal, Islamic, and other backgrounds to
gather support and signatures. He claims to have eventually attracted as many as 190
members,  the  vast  majority  of  whom are  tribal  shaykhs,  along  with  judges,  Islamic
scholars, lawyers (among them a few women) and prosecutors14. 
16 The extent to which all these people actually participate on behalf of Dâr al-Salâm in
arbitrations and other activities, or are only nominal supporters, has been difficult to
establish.  There is,  however,  a core group of members whose names recur in several
arbitration and mediation efforts, and who are introduced below. One of the subscribers
was said to be the son of President cAlî cAbd Allâh Sâlih, which led to the rumour that Dâr
al-Salâm was set up by the government. Yet there is no evidence to confirm this15. 
17 Apart from the personal motivation of Al-Marwanî, who sometimes seems to be engaged
more in a humanitarian mission than an institutional project16, several other events are
likely to have prompted or accelerated the foundation of Dâr al-Salâm. After the initial
rejoicing about the unification of Yemen in 1990, it was not long before serious political
crises arose, which eventually led to the civil war of 1994. The institutional power of the
state – especially in the south – was severely weakened, resulting in enormous delays in
resolving private and public affairs, and in increased corruption in the administrative and
financial apparatus. In this “lawless” situation, groups of citizens began to fall back on
their tribal affinities and customs to seek protection and resolve disputes, rather than
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venturing into long, costly and insecure procedures in official courts. After many years of
gestation,  old unsettled feuds flared up again and the practice of  blood revenge was
revived. Starting from the 1990s, tribal kidnappings of foreign tourists further blemished
the reputation of the tribes and their customs. 
18 On the positive side, the parliamentary elections in 1997 gave rise to a wave of national
energy, which led to new societal, legal and political initiatives17. The promulgation of a
new  Law  of  Arbitration  in  1992  had  already  encouraged  the  creation  of  the  first
arbitration centres in Yemen. This new law was primarily concerned with modern forms
of  arbitration (commercial  and international),  and tried  to  confine  tribal  arbitration
within formal boundaries. The law was amended in 1997 to restore some jurisdiction to
tribal arbitration, but the pace of change was already set. Legally and politically, the time
was right for Dâr al-Salâm. 
 
Good customs, bad customs 
19 In the era of the Hamîd al-Dîn Imamate in North Yemen (1904–62), the Imâm publicly
pursued a madhhab policy,  according to which he imposed teachings from the Zaydî
madhhab (school of law) on the Shâfcî Yemenis, and also denounced the application of
tribal laws that were contrary to sharîca (Messick, 1993:41). Yemenis still recall that a
person  who  was  discovered  even  possessing  a  document  containing  tribal  rules  or
decisions  was  severely  punished,  or  sometimes  put  to  death.  Of  course,  the  Imâm’s
greatest  concern was  that  a  widespread practice  of  tribal  law would  undermine  the
authority of sharîca, the official “law” at the time, and consequently his own Islamic and
political supremacy18. He based his public condemnation of tribal customs on Qur’ânic
verses that forbid tâghût – customs that contradict sharîca – an argument that is still used
by contemporary Yemenis  who reject  tribal  practices19.  In  particular,  rituals  such as
slaughtering and exchanging animals, which are an essential part of the mediation and
arbitration  process,  evoke  to  outsiders  images  from  the  pre-Islamic  jâhiliyya period
(Dostal, 1983:196-213). 
20 Today, the overall perception of tribal customs has hardly changed among urban citizens
and state officials alike. In many public statements, Al-Marwanî emphasises that not all
tribal customs and practices are at odds with sharîca, although he admits that some have
become  corrupted  over  recent  decades.  The  two  main  objectives  of  Dâr  al-Salâm,
therefore,  are  to  suppress  the common phenomenon of  blood revenge (tha’r)  and to
revive “good” tribal customs20. For this purpose, Al-Marwanî organises awareness-raising
campaigns, studies, conferences, and “best practices” (positive examples), in which he
involves renowned tribal shaykhs, Islamic scholars, and poets. He also organises theatre
plays  performed  by  children.  Dâr  al-Salâm operates  predominantly  in  northern  and
north-eastern Yemen, where most Yemeni tribes live, but also in the more southern areas
around Tacizz. 
21 In its ambition to upgrade tribal laws, Dâr al-Salâm aims to collect all  existing tribal
customs and practices (acrâf wa-câdât), in order to unify them into a single tribal code to
be applied by all tribes. Shaykh Abd al-Jalîl Sinân, the son of Shaykh Abd al-Wahâb Sinân,
who is known as the grand marâgha (resource person of tribal customs) of the Bakîl-tribe
21,  formulates  it quite  explicitly:  “We [Dâr al-Salâm] aim at  the codification of  tribal
custom (taqnîn al-curf), just as the state did with sharîca”22. Speaking on behalf of Dâr al-
Salâm, he vows that they will see that “this curf will be in compliance with sharîca and
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qânûn”, for which they can call on the expert advice of their diverse group of members.
They also want to train more qâdî-curfî to apply these “purified” tribal norms. 
22 Dâr al-Salâm thus challenges the state’s monopoly of legal power, and claims authority to
codify tribal customs under its own supervision, and to retain control of this under a
separate jurisdiction that is next (but not contrary) to qânûn.  Tribal customs are not
usually  written  down23,  and  by  their  nature  vary  according  to  tribe,  place  and
circumstances. Once unified and codified, they would stop being curf24.  This would, of
course, have significant implications for the present distribution of power within and
among the tribes, which may explain why the project did not rally much support from the
tribes at this stage, despite the number of tribal resource-persons affiliated to Dâr al-
Salâm25. But the plan to model curf after qânûn is an interesting one. 
23 In their formulations, members of Dâr al-Salâm also differentiate between sharîca and
qânûn, while at the same time acknowledging the statutory codes as Islamic legislation.
The one does not exclude the other: essential to sharîca is that different legal opinions
from  the  various  recognised  law  schools  (madhâhib)  have  equal  authority.  With  the
codification of sharîca into qânûn this fundamental principle is taken away, because a
code, by definition, excludes the co-existence of alternative rules. Hence, qânûn and sharîc
a are two different things. However, when (substantial parts of) the codes are derived
from sharîca, as declared by the Constitution, this qânûn could indeed be designated as
“Islamic legislation”26. 
24 But  the  Yemeni  codifications  apparently  did  not  completely  overrule  sharîca.  Dâr  al-
Salâm, together with most Yemenis,  assign to sharîca an authority next – and usually
superior – to qânûn and curf. This invites us to look at the Yemeni situation as an “Islamic
legal triangle”, an approach that stresses the plurality of legal norms (sharîca, qânûn, curf)
and diverges from the conventional binary opposition of theory and practice27. Although
the present article has a different objective,  the following sections are based on this
premise, and moreover illustrate that this “legal triangle” is far from a static relationship.
 
Plural idioms 
25 In accordance with their concern to maintain the “legal triangle”, Al-Marwanî and other
members use idioms that correspond alternately with each of the three legal fields, so as
to legitimise the position and aims of Dâr alSalâm28. They do this in public statements on
behalf  of  Dâr al-Salâm,  in their  leaflets,  letters  and posters  for  awareness-raising,  in
arbitrational decisions and in the media. Al-Marwanî, for instance, often quotes Qur’ânic
verses that support arbitration, most frequently Sûra 4:114: “In most of their secret talks
there is no good, only if one exhorts to a deed of charity or goodness or conciliation
between people”. This sûra is also printed on the letterhead used by Dâr al-Salâm. Al-
Marwanî explains that this verse calls for reform among the people to prevent bloodshed,
“without discrimination between religion, sex, colour, or nationality … ”, an allusion to a
human rights idiom, but diverted by Al-Marwanî to a Qur’ânic verse: “… because God
Almighty honoured all sons of Adam” (S. 17:70)29. Other exhortations to promote peace
are also derived from the Qur’ân: “God has commanded to make sulh (reconciliation)
between the people” (based on S. 49:9-10)30. And, “God has prescribed mediation between
spouses to protect the privacy of the household from exposure to and interference from
outsiders” (based on S. 4:128)31. He also refers to several Prophetic hadîths (traditions),
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such  as  “islâh  dhât  al-bayn  khayra  min  câmmat  al-salâh  wa-l-sawm”,  better  [one  good]
reconciliation, than the general practice of prayer and fasting. 
26 In addition to these sharîca sources, Al-Marwanî refers to customary sayings like “man
talaba al- sharîca, hurimaqitâluhu” (whoever demands sharîca, it is forbidden to kill him), a
guarantee of customary protection for someone asking for sharîca (also in the sense of
“justice”). Very popular also is “al-thâlithwâsita” (the third is mediator), by which people
are encouraged to intervene and mediate between disputing parties. Indeed, Dâr al-Salâm
often takes the initiative in mediation, even without a request32. 
27 The idiom that is perhaps most frequently used by Al-Marwanî is the reference to qânûn.
While he acknowledges that the state is wâlî al-amr (literally, “the one in charge”, used
here with an Islamic connotation: “the executive of God’s command”), and bears primary
responsibility  to  resolve  legal  disputes,  he  points  out  that  the  courts  are  costly  and
extremely slow, and that family issues in particular are considered too private to bring to
court.  For these reasons,  he argues,  arbitration (tahkîm)  is  a much quicker and more
private alternative, which, moreover, allows the parties to choose their own judges and
norms. It is not without reason that Al-Marwanî here uses the term “tahkîm” rather than
“sulh”, because it refers to the Law of Arbitration (Qânûn al-Tahkîm) that provides the
legal basis for his organisation33. 
28 This official framework is very important for Dâr al-Salâm. Al-Marwanî even places its
creation within a larger regional and international trend to establish commercial and
international arbitration centres, and he specifically refers to arbitration centres of this
kind in Rabât and Riyâd, in New York, Paris and Vienna. He reasons that arbitration not
only prevailed during the time of the Prophet and the four rightly guided Caliphs, but
does so today, even in countries that have a well-functioning court system34. 
29 By  referring  to  role  models  as  dissimilar  as  the  Prophet  Muhammad  and  Western
arbitration centres, Al-Marwanî aims to present tribal arbitration as a legitimate, and
often preferable, alternative to state adjudication. He advocates the possibility of “forum-
shopping”, so that litigants can themselves choose to whom they submit their disputes. A
novelty, and the raison d’être of Dâr al-Salâm, is that he also promotes the possibility of
“norm-shopping”,  the  option to  choose  between different  (legal)  norms.  The  Law of
Arbitration  allows  both  shopping  options,  but  restricts  these  to  certain  specified
jurisdictions35. In practice, as we will see below, these limitations prove rather fluid. 
 
What’s in a name? 
30 Another  modality  of  a  pluralist  discourse  is  demonstrated  by  the  texts  used  in  the
letterheads of Dâr al-Salâm. These texts are printed on all its outgoing mailings, and have
been modified several times already in the last few years. The also changing logo in the
middle of the letterhead depicts internationally known symbols of justice and peace: the
scales of justice with two hands shaking each other underneath, or a scales surrounded by
two olive branches, or a scales joined by a white dove carrying an olive branch, or only a
dove hovering above an open book. All versions are accompanied by the basmallâh and by
Sûra 4:114. 
31 It is more informative to follow the textual trajectory of the full name of Dâr al-Salâm,
and the additional phrases that elucidate its objectives. In the beginning, its full name
was Dâr al-Salâm li-l-Tahkîm, The House of Peace for Arbitration. “Dâr” (house, residence,
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abode) is a traditional designation for institutions, like Dâr al-cUlûm, the Institute for
Higher  Education  under  the  Imamate;  Dâr  al-Iftâ’,  the  House  of  Fatwâ-giving  in
contemporary Yemen; and Dâr al-Kutub, the Public Library. The combination “Dâr al-Salâm
” also refers to paradise and heaven. “Tahkîm”, as mentioned, deliberately alludes to the
Law  of  Arbitration.  The  explanatory  Arabic  text  underneath  reads:  “Voluntary
adjudication house, uniting an association of leading Muslim scholars, judges, and tribal
shaykhs to solve various disputes by way of peacemaking and arbitration, and the issuance
of fatwâs and legal advice; customary-civil arbitration.”36
32 Another letterhead renders the name in English: “Assalam Arbitration House”, and the
accompanying text (in Arabic) reads: “Voluntary adjudication house for solving various
sharîca,  legal  and customary  disputes,  the  division  of  inheritances  and attestation  of
contracts,  fatwâs,  legal  advices,  and  advocate  activities;  commercial-civil-customary-
national-international arbitration.”37
33 In the third variant, the name of Dâr al-Salâm is changed into Dâr al-Salâm al-Ijtimâcî wa-l-
Tahkîm, The House for Social Peace and Arbitration38. The term “social” is added to cover
activities that are not strictly legal  in nature,  and to indicate more clearly its  (civil)
societal  approach,  as  Al-Marwanî  explained39.  Two exhortations  are  added as  well:  a
section from the Qur’ânic verse, “fa ittaqû allâha wa-aslihû dhata baynikum” (S. 8:1), “So
fear God and keep straight the relations between yourselves”, and the slogan, “So that
Yemen [becomes] free from blood-revenge” (min ajli  Yaman khâlî  min al-tha’r),  both of
which are kept in all later versions. The explanatory text says: “The House unites the elite
of senior Muslim scholars, judges, tribal shaykhs, and Members of Parliament and of the
Consultative Council, to stop cases of blood revenge and solve conflicts; an independent,
popular organisation.”40
34 The name lengthens further:  Hay’at  Dâr al-Salâm al-Ijtimâcî  wa-l-Tahkîm,  The House for
Social Peace and Arbitration Organisation, or in Al-Marwanî’s own translation: “Social
Peace and Arbitration House Committee”. The word hay’a(t) is known in Yemen to stand
for  different  forms  of  cooperation  (tacâwuniyyât),  but  it  is  also  used  by  modern
organisations like the UN, and can mean committee, as in “arbitration committee” (hay’at
al-tahkîm). The explanatory text is much the same. 
35 There  also  circulates  a  letterhead  only  in  English:  “Alsalam  Local  &  International
Arbitration House”,  most  likely  to  alert  a  foreign clientele,  even though the  further
content of  this particular letter was in Arabic.  The latest transformation I  have seen
reads: Munazzamat Dâr al-Salâm al-Ijtimâcî,  The House of Social Peace Institution, which
alludes to a further institutionalisation (or to the intention thereof).  The explanatory
Arabic text is now reduced to: “Supreme council for combating blood feuds and violence (
cunf), and spreading a culture of tolerance.”41 I was told that the newly added word cunf
also hints at  acts of  terrorism: the events on and after 11 September 2001 have had
immediate and far-reaching sociopolitical repercussions in Yemen, especially in tribal
spheres. 
36 Evidently, Dâr al-Salâm is sensitive to social and political changes on the national and
international scene, and adapts its services accordingly. It does not limit itself to solve
strictly legal matters (“legal” even in the widest sense of the word), but is concerned with
establishing social peace and security in general, combatting any form of violence, from
“traditional” (blood revenge) to “modern” (terrorism).  By invoking different types of
idiom (Islamic,  customary,  legal),  Dâr  al-Salâm tries  to appeal  to  different  sectors  of
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Yemeni society, as well as the state, and offers services in a form that is legitimate to all.
But also, of course, to attract sponsors. 
 
The language of money 
37 We should not be blind to the role money plays. Dâr al-Salâm is actively seeking financial
support from as many potential donors as possible, and by changing its name from Dâr to
Hay’a to Munazzama it is trying to make itself more visible as an NGO. The lucrative
foreign donors might otherwise not recognise an assembly of traditional shaykhs and
scholars  as  a  product  of  “civil  society”,  and  thus  a  possible  “target  group”  or
“counterpart” for funding. The use of English also points in this direction, given that
hardly any member of Dâr al-Salâm speaks English, neither do the Yemenis who seek
their help. The addition of “combatting violence” as one of its rephrased objectives has,
as  mentioned,  undoubtedly to do with the growing interest  of  the West  – the US in
particular – in Yemen after the 11 September attack. Several cooperation programmes
are presently being developed in tribal areas. In fact, in 2001 Dâr al-Salâm requested and
received its first funding from the US Embassy in Sancâ’ to carry out a project to spread
legal awareness among Yemeni tribes42. 
38 The question of Dâr al-Salâm’s financial resources deserves to be explored a little further,
as it gives an indication of the circles in which the organisation operates. From the outset,
Al-Marwanî has solicited gifts  from members or supporters of  Dâr al-Salâm, external
beneficiaries, charity funds and foreign donors. Often he uses the print media to launch
an appeal. For instance, the newspaper Al-Balâgh published an article showing a picture
of Al-Marwanî and Paramount Shaykh cAbd Allâh al-Ahmar, the Speaker of Parliament,
amicably chewing qât together. In the adjoining text, Al-Ahmar praises the objectives of
Dâr al-Salâm and offers financial support43. In Al-Wahda, Al-Marwanî appeals directly to
President cAlî cAbd Allâh Sâlih to support Dâr al-Salâm44.  The Head of Dâr al-Iftâ, the
Grand Muftî of Yemen, Ahmad Muhammad Zabâra, provided a handwritten exhortation
to donate zakât (Islamic tax) and sadaqât (alms) to Dâr al-Salâm45. 
39 Of course, an important source of income flows in from arbitration. Although Dâr al-
Salâm in certain cases also accepts payments in kind, such as meals, water or qât, when
performing major tribal arbitrations it usually requests a percentage of the allotted diya
(blood money). Since the diya as applied by tribal law can amount to a considerable sum,
this provides a significant source of income46. Nevertheless, most of the time Dâr al-Salâm
seems to be short of cash47. 
40 To sum up, the deliberate “expansionism” in the textual presentation of Dâr al-Salâm
should also be viewed in the mundane light of seeking funding from (foreign) donors. But
this should not be exaggerated as being the main driving force. 
 
The members of Dâr al-Salâm
41 For  a  deeper  understanding  of  Dâr  al-Salâm,  which  operates  in  the  context of  a
developing country with weak institutions, it is almost imperative to have a closer look at
the individuals behind it. Their personal merits, class, family, religious denomination, or
the other power bases to which they belong, form the pillars of Dâr al-Salâm, from which
it derives most of its real authority and legitimacy. On the other hand, a closer encounter
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may tell us more about the members’ own motivations for joining Dâr al-Salâm. The most
significant  members  are  now  briefly  introduced,  some  whose  names  and  personal
qualifications are brought to the fore by Dâr al-Salâm, and others with more of a view to
their class or occupation, on which basis Al-Marwanî has modelled the organisational
structure of Dâr al-Salâm. 
 
The shaykhs
42 By far the most important active member is the esteemed Shaykh cAbd al-Wahâb Sinân.
His reputation and authority are essential for the legitimation and implementation of the
tribal settlements achieved by Dâr al-Salâm. While Al-Marwanî is the driving force and
coordinator behind most activities, Dâr al-Salâm could not have gained such recognition
and success among the tribes without Sinân. 
43 Sinân is about 90 years of age, the Paramount Shaykh of Arhab (a Bakîltribe), the ultimate
resource person of tribal custom (marâgha, marjac), and a high judicial authority among
the tribes of Bakîl. These distinctions make him renowned outside tribal society as well.
Sinân acts as the head of the Supreme Committee of Arbitration within Dâr al-Salâm;
sometimes  he  is  referred  to  as  its  president48.  His  son,  Abd  al-Jalîl,  is  another  core
member. A third famous Bakîl-Shaykh, Ghâlib al-Ajdac, Paramount Shaykh of Murad and
Madhaj (Ma’rib), also participated from the very beginning and acts as Secretary-General.
Other members belong to the tribes of Khawlân, Nihm, Al-Baydâ’ and various smaller
factions. 
44 Whereas  Bakîl  provides  the  majority  of  members,  Hâshid,  the  other  main  tribal
confederation, is also represented in Dâr al-Salâm, for instance by several factions from
Sanhân, the tribe to which President cAli cAbd Allâh Sâlih belongs. The highest tribal
authority of Hâshid is the Paramount Shaykh cAbd Allâh al-Ahmar, who, as mentioned
above, also holds the highest legislative position in the state as the Speaker of Parliament.
Although Al-Ahmar is not directly involved in Dâr al-Salâm, he has supported it publicly. 
45 Other tribal members are not only introduced by their tribal affiliation, but also by their
governmental position. At least six of them are Members of Parliament, and there is also
the Deputy Head of the Department of Tribal Affairs, Shaykh Yahyâ cAbd Allâh Kâmil,
along with the son of the Head of this department,  Shaykh cAlî Ahmad Duwayd. The
department comes under the Ministry of the Interior, and provides salaries to shaykhs
from all levels in return for official registration. This, of course, forms a means by which
the state can exercise some control over the authority structures and affairs of the tribes.
In return, the shaykhs gain (financial) support and status from the state. By participating
in  Dâr  al-Salâm,  these  shaykhs  have  found a  third  platform from which to  exercise
authority. 
46 Many northern tribes thus have a representative in Dâr al-Salâm. In this way, Al-Marwanî
has not only secured broad tribal support – and protection – for Dâr al-Salâm, but has also
created a pool of tribal authorities from which he can draw the most suitable arbitration
committee to solve a tribal dispute. Depending on the type of conflict and the parties
involved, factors such as neutrality or, on the contrary, a certain relationship with the
tribes at odds, determine the selection process, as well as personal probity and authority.
The shaykhs are grouped together under the Supreme Committee of Counsellors of Tribal
Custom (al-hay’a al-culyâ li-l-mustashârîn li-l-curf  al-qabalî),  elsewhere referred to as the
Arbitration Committee of Tribal Elders (al-lajna al-tahkîmiyya min al-mashâyikh)49. 
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47 When  asked  further  about  the  membership,  cAbd  al-Jalîl,  Sinân’s  son,  reveals  that
whereas Dâr al-Salâm looks at first glance like a “tribal” institution, most of its members
are  in  fact  sayyids  (or  Hâshimîs,  as  Yemenis  say,  descendants  of  the  Prophet)50.  He
explains that Al-Marwanî himself is a Hâshimî, something that he had not mentioned in
his CV, nor in his interviews. Yemen is one of the few Muslim countries where sayyids
usually  hide their  descent,  because of  their  association with the overthrown Imamic
regime. For that reason also, relatively few sayyids have occupied high positions in the
post-revolutionary governments, which may explain their reappearance in “alternative”
power circles51. 
48 A sayyid whose public reputation and standing survived the Imâm’s downfall was the late
Grand Muftî Ahmad Muhammad Zabâra, who was always mentioned as a prime member
of Dâr al-Salâm. We know that Al-Marwanî was a former student of his, but one would not
immediately expect that an Islamic notable of his standing would attach his name to an
organisation that has a “tribal” reputation. Zabâra had been a broad-minded and highly
respected traditional câlim (learned scholar) who during his life had sometimes clashed
with culamâ’ adhering to stricter schools of thought. The government had created Dâr al-
Iftâ’ as a tribute to his important role in the Revolution of 1962 (Haykel, 2003:197–200). 
49 Dâr al-Iftâ’ is further represented in Dâr al-Salâm by its Vice-President, Hammûd cAbbâs
al-Mu’ayyid, and the second Deputy Head, cAbd al-Rahmân Hammûd al-Washîlî, who is
moreover  a  high  official  of  the  Ministry  of  Endowments  (awqâf).  Another  reputable
member from the Islamic establishment is the General Religious Guide (al-murshid al-câmm
),  Muhammad  Isma`îl  al-’Amrânî.  Like  Zabâra,  Al-‘Amrânî  is  a  scholar  of  traditional
standing who is respected in different circles. Apart from giving fatwâs and other
scholarly  and  religious  guidance,  including  many  publications,  he  also  teaches
candidatejudges at the High Institute for the Judiciary. These renowned Islamic scholars
form the Committee of Iftâ’ (lajnat al-iftâ’) of Dâr al-Salâm. Al-Washîlî is mentioned as the
Director of Documentation (mudîr al-tawthîq). 
50 Other  sayyid-culama’  are  Yahyâ  Yahyâ  al-Shibâmî,  a  member  of  the  government’s
Consultative Council,  and Yahyâ Nâsir  al-Durra,  who is  the Responsible  for  Religious
Information  (mas’ûl  al-iclâm  al-dînî),  and  several  others  whose  functions  are  not
mentioned.  None of  them is  referred to as a Hâshimî or sayyid in any of  the issued
statements of Dâr al-Salâm, but as “al-callâma al-hujja” (the very learned, the “proof” [of
Islam]), an honorific Shîcî title. These culamâ’ function under the Supreme Committee of
cUlamâ’ (alhay’a al-culiâ li-l-culamâ’) of Dâr al-Salâm. 
51 Whether these Islamic scholars take an active part in tribal arbitrations, or give a sharcî
legitimisation to an curfî settlement, or are only engaged to solve sharîca questions, was
difficult to establish. Some photos taken by Dâr al-Salâm at the scene of tribal settlements
show the presence of a few scholars among the many tribesmen. In several of its written
decisions, their names feature as members of mixed arbitration committees, but their
input seems to consist mainly of advising the transfer of the case to the official court
when they fear a deviation from sharîca. In this capacity, the culamâ’ serve an important
purpose of Dâr al-Salâm, which is to remain within the framework of qânûn: the Law of
Arbitration prescribes  that  the  Court  of  Appeal  can annul  an arbitration ruling that
contravenes the provisions of the Islamic sharîca and the public order52. 
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The qâdîs and qânûnîs
52 Dâr al-Salâm claims the participation of  about seventy judges,  both court judges and
“judges” from the qâdî-class. Twenty-two are mentioned by name in an issued leaflet and
in  Al-Balâgh  newspaper,  but  the  occupation  of  only  a  few  is  listed:  Qâdî Husayn
Muhammad al-Mahdî, at that time President of the Appeal Court of Sancâ’ and Al-Jawf,
and Qâdî Yahyâ Muhammad al-Shihârî from the same court53. Then there is Qâdî Yahyâ
Muhammad al-Jibrânî, Judge of the Supreme Court. Various members of the notable Al-
Akwac-family also feature in the leaflet, among them Qâdî Ahmad Muhammad al-Akwac,
who is listed as a member of the Yemeni Association of cUlamâ’. The qâdîs take part in the
Commercial  and  Civil  Departments  of  Dâr  al-Salâm  as  well  as  in  the  Arbitration
Committee of Judges (al-lajna al-tahkîmiyya min al-qudâh). 
53 Other legal specialists (whom I denote as qânûnîs) are mostly lawyers, legal scholars and
professors of law. The lawyers represent women and deprived people pro bono in court
on behalf of Dâr al-Salâm. The few women that Dâr al-Salâm includes belong mainly to
this group: some are lawyers, one a university professor, and there is also the chief editor
of the newspaper Al-Mar’a (The Woman), Sâmiya al-Ahmadî. The legal experts form the
Supreme Committee of Legal Advisors (al-lajna al-culyâ li-l-mustashârîn al-qânûniyyîn). 
 
The NGO
54 By bringing together members from the “old classes” under an NGO agreement, while
adding the “new class” of qânûnîs, Dâr al-Salâm created something genuinely new, which
had not existed before in this form. This is not to say that the notion itself is entirely new:
when we go back in the history of Yemen, we find an earlier form of cooperation between
shaykhs, sayyids and qâdîs in tribal mediation, namely, the hijra (lit. “set aside”, protected
status). In the tribal context, hijra could denote a protected place (a settlement of Zaydî
sayyids, a neutral space for tribal gatherings), a protected person or family (sayyids, qâdîs,
a mediator), or a protected occasion (a weekly market, a mediation). In brief, under this
protection, sayyids and qâdîs could live in peace in tribal areas, and in return would assist
the tribes by using their knowledge of sharîca to resolve controversies about sharîca issues,
announce fatwâs, attest contracts, and so on. It is beyond the scope of this article to
explore this typical Yemeni institution further; suffice to say that sharcî-curfî cooperation
in tribal mediation had existed before (Puin, 1984:483–494; al-Akwac, 1996). 
55 Despite  its  new format,  however,  Dâr  al-Salâm still  depends heavily  on the personal
authority and power bases of its members. The exact organisational structure of Dâr al-
Salâm remains  obscure,  because  of  the  lack  of  formal  statutes  and  the  incoherence
between  the  different  sources  that  refer  to  the  committees,  but  the  individual
qualifications and backgrounds of its members are always neatly specified. 
56 Yet, Dâr al-Salâm is certainly more than the sum of its members. Several shaykhs from
Bakîl told the newspaper Al-Nahâr that they felt indeed the need for a new organisational
structure54. Shaykhs Sinân and Al-Ajda`, for instance, stated that “an organisation like
Dâr al-Salâm is needed to reunite mashâyikh and wuqalâ’ (tribal authorities) from different
tribes,  to  secure  the  application  of  tribal  customs  but  also  to  take  part  as  a  civil
organisation (hay’a madaniyya) in the building of civil society (al-mujtamac al-madanî) in
Yemen.” The elder Sinân refers to the fact that the tribes can no longer produce new
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generations of marâghât, as tribal members are more interested in obtaining positions as
MPs  or  businessmen,  and  thus  gradually  step  out  of  their  traditional  structures.
Elsewhere, his son cAbd al-Jalîl relates that the shaykhs got tired of solving the same cases
over and over again without any variation or promotion within the tribal hierarchy, and
became  bored  with  always  sitting  in  the  same  maqyals.  He  says  that  the  innovative
approach of Dâr al-Salâm serves as both a professional and personal stimulant for them,
and as a way to combine tribal (qabalî) status with civil (madanî) status55. 
57 The pay-off for the shaykhs – and the sayyids alike – is that by performing arbitration
within the framework of a civil  institution,  they gain a new status and conquer new
“territory”. In newspaper reports about Dâr al-Salâm, for instance, it is noteworthy that
the shaykhs are always referred to by both their tribal affiliation and their position in Dâr
al-Salâm: “Shaykh Muhsin Ahmad Jamîl, Member of the Supreme Committee of Dâr al-
Salâm, Tribe of Âl Ghafîr (Nihm) says […]”. It seems a win-win combination. 
 
Scenes of interaction 
58 The following extracts from cases serve to illustrate modes of interaction between Dâr al-
Salâm and other actors, and its role in accommodating curf, sharîca and qânûn. With this
in mind, only those passages that refer to the role of Dâr al-Salâm are highlighted, while
the exact details and procedures of the case are omitted. 
The  telephone  rings.  “Macâk  Dâr  al-Salâm,  mukhtassa  bi-l-tha’r”56,  Al-Marwanî
responds. A tribal dispute is reported, mediation requested. Al-Marwanî jumps up
and starts phoning around to assemble members and others to join the group of
mediators. The nearest qât-chewing time is used to discuss more details of the case
and plan a strategy. If necessary, even state officials are approached to facilitate the
mediation. The feuding tribes are notified, and the mediators set out en groupe to
the location of the fighting, sometimes days away. 
59 This is how I once witnessed the reception of a mediation request by Dâr al-Salâm. Al-
Marwanî relates that sometimes he is approached by one or both of the parties in dispute,
at other times he intervenes on his own initiative. Ideally, the requesting party is asked to
write a letter to the secretariat of Dâr al-Salâm to clarify the dispute. The other party is
then approached, and if both agree that Dâr al-Salâm should perform the arbitration,
they sign an arbitration agreement (wathîqat al-tahkîm). If no agreement can be reached,
Al-Marwanî refers them to the court, “because the court derives its competence from the
law, Dâr al-Salâm from the consent of the parties”57. Al-Marwanî knows precisely what
the Law of Arbitration prescribes58. 
60 In important or long-lasting tribal disputes, Dâr al-Salâm assembles a large number of
shaykhs from different (neighbouring) tribes, together with Islamic authorities and state
officials,  members and non-members alike.  Such a mixed delegation will  impress the
feuding tribes both in its quality and size, and compel them to lay down their arms and
accept mediation. The mediators rely on “the customs and the forefathers” (al-acrâf wa-l-
aslâf) to avoid encountering any aggression on their mission. They refer to it as their hijra
protection. 
61 On arrival, the group splits in two and each half joins one of the parties involved in the
conflict in order to stop the firing. Then they start collecting from both sides a symbolic
number of firearms, the so-called banâdiq al-tahkîm (rifles of the arbitration), and begin to
hear the pleas of each party, either on the same spot or on the nearest protected (hijra)
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location. One of the means of bringing the parties together is the use of zâmil-poems,
tribal poems which are exchanged traditionally during a mediation, with all the men of
both tribes lining up in two long chains that  eventually form a circle so as to close
symbolically the distance caused by the enmities (Caton, 1990). This is followed by a ritual
exchange of bulls and weapons, supervised by different levels of guarantors (dumanâ’)
until a sulh (truce) or hukm (ruling) is reached. Usually, the final mediation or arbitration
document is written down at a place inside, during a qât-session, or sometimes at the
premises of Dâr al-Salâm. It is always read aloud in the presence of both parties59. 
62 An important innovation of Dâr al-Salâm’s in this still very traditional form of settlement
is that it acts under its institutional “flag”. Al-Marwanî always displays in one way or
another the name of  Dâr al-Salâm: he drives a Mercedes jeep (previous cars did not
survive tough interventions, he said), which has the name “Hay’at Dâr al-Salâm al-Ijtimâcî
wa-l-Tahkîm” and its phone number written all over it.  As a variant of the traditional
zâmil-poetry,  he distributes  written poems or  letters  carrying the house logo,  which
explain  to  the  feuding  tribes  the  harmfulness  of  tha’r and  other  bad  customs.
Nevertheless, in his Mercedes he also brings along a white flag of peace (calam al-salâm),
and in a separate truck several bulls.  Without these traditional instruments for tribal
peace-making,  he would not  even be allowed on the scene.  The hijra-protection still
proves  more  effective  to  ward  off  violence  in  tribal  areas  than  any  official  law  or
institutional framework. 
63 The solution or containment of tha’r is a primary objective of Dâr al-Salâm, as it never
tires  of  emphasising.  Tha’r is  extremely  widespread  in  Yemen,  and  one  of  its  most
dreaded social consequences is that it can lead to fitna (chaos, disorder)60. This latter term
is often used by Yemenis to denote something “out of control”, the bombshell under any
organised entity,  including the state.  Combatting tha’r is  therefore  not  only  a  major
concern of Dâr al-Salâm, but also of the Yemeni state, which prefers to see “law and
order” implemented through its own institutions and laws. Failing that, it is not unusual
that  it  seeks cooperation with influential  personalities  and organisations like Dâr al-
Salâm to solve major tribal wars that occur on its territory. In this respect, two case
studies are worth mentioning. 
The tribes of Al-Hanashât and Âl al-Sayyâd (from Nihm, Bakîl) had waged war for
over twenty years, resulting in many casualties and much destruction of property.
President cAlî cAbd Allâh Sâlih himself had at long last appealed to all shaykhs and
other authorities, including Dâr al-Salâm, to solve this feud as soon as possible. Dâr
al-Salâm  responded  by  assembling  a  strong  mediation  delegation  of  prominent
shaykhs,  headed  by  Shaykh  Abd  al-Wahâb  Sinân  and  Al-Marwanî  himself,  and
Shaykh cAlî Ahmad Duwayd, son of the Head of the Department of Tribal Affairs
(Ministry of the Interior). 
64 Part of the conclusion of the mediation decision serves to illustrate that tribal curf was
applied: 
A pure and honest sulh has been reached between Al-Sayyâdî and Al-Hanashî and is
incumbent on everyone, old and young, protector and protected (âmin wa-mu’min)61,
in  every  corner  of  the  world  –  roads,  markets,  protected  places  (ahjar),  cities,
valleys.  Whomever  violates  this  sulh,  his  blame  can  only  be  restored  (naqâ’,
restoring the “good name”) by paying forty-four sums of blood money (marbûcal-
muhadcash)62 and relinquishing all his rights, his house, and everything he owns […
]63. 
65 According  to  custom,  the  document  concludes  with  the  names  and  signatures,  or
thumbprints, of the shaykhs who accept the sulh,  of the ahlal-wajîh (those who “give”
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their face,  i.e.  their honour – the guarantors),  and of the shaykhs of  all  other tribes
present. 
66 Another case involved a spectacular tribal settlement, recollected in lively manner by the
son of Shaykh Sinân, Abd al-Jalîl64: 
In 1998–1999, a major tribal war raged between Banî Matar (Bakîl) and Al-Hayma,
west of Sancâ’. The government had sent several high officials to intervene, from
the General Director of the Governorate up to the Vice-President himself, but to no
avail. Then it had turned to several important mashâyikh, among whom was the son
of  Shaykh  Al-Ahmar  (Paramount  shaykh  of  Hâshid).  Again,  without  success.
Eventually, the President himself asked Shaykh Sinân senior and Dâr al-Salâm if
they could settle the tribal war as taraf sâfî (a neutral party), against a payment of
two million Yemeni riyals (about 15,000 Euro). Dâr al-Salâm accepted. This time it
opted  for  the  quantitative  approach,  and  assembled  around  2,000  shaykhs  and
tribal  notables,  mostly  from the  tribe  of  Arhab  (Bakîl)  in  order  to  impress  the
fighting parties by sheer numbers65. 
After notifying the tribes, the whole group departed from Sancâ’ towards Mahwît,
where the scene of the battle was. The huge delegation, carrying the traditional
white flags, had presidential permission to pass all official checkpoints, and their
march was facilitated by security officials. Upon arrival, they split into two groups,
and occupied the houses of the disputing parties, settling down for as long as it
would take until  the parties would stop fighting and accept their mediation. By
imposing themselves in such numbers on the tribal households – although all in a
peaceful manner, as it was related – the delegation deliberately put a major burden
on the “hosts” to fulfil  the tribal  honour of hospitality (duyûfa).  The impending
financial and physical nightmare of having to feed so many guests, made the parties
quickly agree to settle. 
The parties were offered the choice between a settlement according to sharîca or c
urf. The sharîca settlement could take place either “inside or outside the court”, as
Abduljalîl explained. “Outside” meant by a qâdî mardî or qâdî tarâdî (a judge chosen
by the parties on consent). If they opted for an curfî settlement, the parties could
select  the  arbitrators  from  the  Arhabî  shaykhs  present,  or  from  another  tribe,
whichever they preferred. Both parties agreed on Arhabî arbitrators, and cAbd al-
Wahâb  Sinân,  “Paramount  shaykh  from  Arhab  and  President  of the  Supreme
Committee of Dâr al-Salâm”, acted as the leading arbitrator. 
67 What happened next is unfortunately not reported, but this information already tells us
more than we learn from the official language of the state (in statutory laws, decrees,
formal statements), namely, that the state needs the tribes to help preserve order. This in
itself  is  not  unusual;  the  novelty  is  that  the  cooperation  is  taking  place  under  new
frameworks. First, the nature of the state has drastically changed with the introduction of
codified laws and national institutions from 1962 onwards.  Second, the nature of the
relationship between the state and tribal  society is  also changing.  In these two case
studies, the President called not only on individual mashâyikh, but simultaneously on Dâr
al-Salâm. In other words, he seems to be encouraging tribal authorities to operate under
an institutional and legal framework. Dâr al-Salâm thus positioned itself here not only as
a mediator, but also as an intermediary between the state and the tribes. 
A drawn-out dispute between Bakîl and Hâshid had already caused many casualties,
the most recent being a homicide of a boy from Banî Dabyân (from Khawlân, Bakîl)
in front of the Ministry of Local Administration in Sancâ’. Khawlân could not be
persuaded to accept settlement through arbitration, but wanted the accused to be
handed over by Hâshid. Hâshid refused, and since the accused was someone from
the  renowned  Al-Ahmar  family,  the  highest  authorities  became  involved.  Even
several  culamâ’  had cooperated with  the  mashâyikh in  the  process  towards  the
settlement,  among  whom  was  the  notorious  Shaykh  al-Islâm  cAbd  al-Majîd  al-
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Zindânî,  leader  of  the  Islamic  wing  of  the  Islâh-party  and  an  internationally
renowned  Islamist  preacher  (Dresch  and  Haykel,  1995:405-431).  He  had  urged
Khawlân to submit the case to justice (cadâla) by confining the accused in the state
prison, and then “let sharîca run its course.” Khawlân had accepted his proposal, on
the basis that “Islamic sharîca is superior to all acrâf.” 
The Hâshid tribe had then asked for time to apprehend the accused by itself, but
had failed to do this,  so the case dragged on again. Finally, after one-and a-half
months  of  negotiations,  Dâr  al-Salâm succeeded to  bring  in  President  cAlî  cAbd
Allâh Sâlih  to  meet  with the two antagonistic  tribes  and a group of  mediators,
among whom Shaykh Ghâlib b. Nâsir al-Ajdac, “Paramount shaykh from Ma’rib and
Secretary-General of Dâr al-Salâm”. The President, who was praised by Al-Ajdac for
his cooperative role as marjac al-jamîc (“the resource of all”), guaranteed that Hâshid
would accept the verdict by Khawlân. From the specific context, we gather that the
President meant “guarantee” in its tribal connotation, which puts the honour of the
guarantor at stake when the verdict is not executed. It is worth mentioning that the
President is a member of the Sanhân-tribe, which belongs to Hâshid66. 
68 This  report  is  intriguing  for  various  reasons.  The  (presumably)  final  settlement  was
reached through curf, this time with the active involvement of the President, who seems
to take advantage of his two identities – as the highest representative of the state and as a
member of Hâshid. Moreover, the curfî settlement went against the advice from one of the
most authoritative Islamist preachers, Shaykh al-Islâm Al-Zindânî, to apply sharîca and
resort to state institutions.  Al-Zindânî’s involvement in tribal  affairs is  in itself  quite
remarkable. 
69 One would have expected the application of qânûn, because the case concerned a serious
matter of public order, and a homicide had been committed in the capital Sancâ’, even in
front  of  a  state  institution.  Tribal  forces,  however,  proved  stronger  than  state
mechanisms: elsewhere in the report we read that before the settlement was arranged,
the public prosecution had arrested dozens of Khawlânîs, but their fellow-tribesmen had
raided the state prison and released them all. This is not at all unusual in the Yemeni
context. Given such unruly conditions, qânûn and sharîca can often provide nothing more
than an obligatory idiom. 
70 These three case studies were just a few examples among a range of cases solved by Dâr
al-Salâm since its creation67. Even in the absence of fuller details, they give an indication
of how the organisation moves between norms, procedures and actors from different
legal domains to solve a dispute. The primary goal is to satisfy the parties involved, but
Dâr al-Salâm is also observant of higher interests, such as restoring peace and security, in
the full awareness that this is also a major interest of the government. 
 
Code and custom 
71 Since both the government and Dâr al-Salâm formally operate under the framework of
qânûn, a brief sketch of the legal rules on tribal arbitration and tribal custom is in place.
The first codified provisions about arbitration in the former Yemen Arab Republic formed
part  of  the  “Islamic  legislations”  (altashrîcât  al-islamiyya)  drafted  by  the  Sharîca 
Codification Commission in the late 1970s68. Law 90/1976 contained only four articles that
dealt  with arbitration proper,  which identified it  as an alternative procedural  course
within the framework of qânûn. 
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72 The second Law of Arbitration (33/1981) approached arbitration with much more of an
eye to the tribal reality in Yemen, and allowed a separate jurisdiction for tribal law and
procedure. The most quoted article of this Law is Article 21: 
The forefathers  and customs have their  own rule,  which control  the sparing of
blood and the settling of conflict69. 
73 In other words, (tribal) customs could set aside statutory norms in cases of homicide and
dispute settlement between tribes. Such generous consideration for tribal customs can no
longer be found in the revised Law of Arbitration (22/1992), issued two years after the
unification of  Yemen.  In Article 3,  the new law subsumes all  types of  arbitration on
Yemeni territory under its own jurisdiction. Cases in which no arbitration is allowed are
the hudûd (Qur’ânic offenses); licân (sworn allegation of adultery by a spouse); annulment
of the marriage contract; impeachment and prosecution of judges; disputes related to
procedures of compulsory enforcement; other matters in which no sulh is allowed; and
everything connected to the public order (Article 5, emphasis added). “Public order”, as
in all modern legal systems, refers among other things to criminal offences and their
punishment, which therefore should fall within the jurisdiction of the court. 
74 The  state’s  official  position  with  regard  to  the  application  of  (tribal)  customs  is
formulated in Article 45: 
The arbitration tribunal shall decide on the dispute on the basis of the statutory
principles (al-qawâ`id al-qânûniyya) on which both parties agree [emphasis added].
[…] In all cases, the arbitration tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with
Yemeni  law (qânûn)  or  the provisions  of  the contract  concluded by the parties,
while taking into account the customs and social usages (al-acrâf wa-l-câdât al-ijtimâc
iyya),  and likewise  the commercial  customs and usages  followed in  this  type of
transactions. 
75 The integral text of this article mentions the word “qânûn(-iyya)” no fewer than nine
times.  Customs can no longer wholly govern an arbitration decision, but can only be
taken into consideration as long as they remain within the framework of the code. This
dramatic  policy  shift,  in  comparison to  the previous  law,  has  everything to  do with
international trends in arbitration, and with the state’s national ambition to exercise a
monopoly of legal power. However, this firm position did not last for long. In 1997, the
article was amended as follows: 
The arbitration tribunal shall decide on the dispute on the basis of the principles (
al-qawâcid) on which both parties agree […]70. 
76 The crucial adjective “qânûniyya” in the first sentence is left out, which allows a much
broader interpretation of “al-qawâcid” by admitting non-statutory rules as well. However,
another restriction has been added through the back door. The last sentence of the article
now reads: 
[…]  while  taking  into  account  the  customs  and  social  usages,  and  likewise  the
commercial  customs  and  usages  followed  in  this  type  of  transaction  on  the
condition  that  in  all  cases  there  will  be  no  contradiction  with  the  rules  of  the
Islamic sharîca. [emphasis added] 
77 In other words, tribal customs, just as commercial usages, ultimately have to comply with
sharîca. Sharîca has thus been designated as the ultimate legal reference for all types of
arbitrations. As a control mechanism, the law requires that arbitration decisions (ahkâm
al-muhakkamîn)  are  registered  at  the  court  (Article  20).  However,  since  there  is  no
sanction for  not  registering arbitrations,  in  practice  only a  very limited number are
submitted.  Some decisions by Dâr al-Salâm show registration stamps of  the Court  of
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Appeal in Sancâ’, others do not. In case a plaintiff or the court suspects a deviation from
sharîca,  the court  is  also competent  to  review the decision in an appeal  procedure71.
Usually, however, tribal arbitrations are appealed along tribal procedures (manhâ). 
78 Over  a  period  of  twenty  years,  the  successive  Laws  of  Arbitration  have  granted,
withdrawn and restored varying powers of jurisdiction to tribal arbitration. This tells us
that the state has much difficulty, even at the prescriptive level, of incorporating tribal
arbitration into its framework. In practice, even less control is achieved. From the above
examples  of  cases,  we  learned that  homicides  were  settled  by  arbitration instead of
prosecuted by the state, and that tribal norms were applied that contradicted official
norms and sharîca, such as the extremely high amounts paid in blood money. Officially,
these are deviations from qânûn, but we have also seen that it is not always possible to
enforce the law, if other powers have stronger means of imposing their own norms and
procedures. In such “overruling” situations, the closest the state can come to adhering to
its own rules is to cooperate with a societal organisation that conforms to the state’s set
framework, even if only nominally. This is why Dâr al-Salâm is potentially an attractive
intermediary for the state in its dealings with the tribes in settling disputes. 
 
Conclusion 
79 Dâr al-Salâm is a product of the modern era. In pre-modern times, tribal structures and
tribal arbitration could survive in their “traditional” forms, and there was no need or
force that could induce their reorganisation.  The formation of  the modern state,  the
introduction of qânûn since the 1970s, and the recent calls (and international pressure) to
develop a “civil society”, have created a historical momentum for change. This process is,
however, very slow and complex. Even up to the early 1990s, statutory law permitted the
separate  functioning  of  tribal  norms  and  procedures.  Another  reason  is  that  many
individuals  who found positions in the new state  apparatus  still  remain loyal  to  the
Islamic and tribal networks that helped them into these positions. This also explains why
the state often does not seem to pursue a single course of action. 
80 With  such  a  reality,  “the  state”,  in  its  institutional  sense,  searches  for  ways  to
accommodate to the stronger societal forces without losing too much effective control.
An  organisation  like  Dâr  al-Salâm bridges  the  gap  between  state  and  tribal  society,
because it  brings formalisation of  and better  accessibility  to the tribal  structures.  In
addition, the establishing of Dâr al-Salâm in accordance with legal prescriptions makes it
a legitimate partner for the state, as well as more visible for potential foreign partners. 
81 Complementary  interests  also govern  the  relationship  between  Dâr  al-Salâm and  its
members. The organisation relies heavily on the authority and networks of its individual
members,  who in their turn have much to gain from their participation (civil  status,
personal  gain,  consolidation  of  “good”  tribal  customs).  Dâr  al-Salâm  still  cannot  do
without the weight of personalities like the elder Sinân, but it is likely that in the longer
run, the younger Sinân will not be able to do without an organisation like Dâr al-Salâm,
since the existing tribal  structures seem to be in decline.  And for those who had no
advantageous position to begin with,  like Al-Marwanî,  the civil  framework of  Dâr al-
Salâm could place him at the side of Yemen’s most senior leaders. 
82 Pragmatic considerations, finally, seem to determine which norm of the “legal triangle” is
applied in arbitrations. Where as sharîca is denoted by all actors as the ultimate reference,
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it  serves  as  an  idiom  rather  than  as  the  practice.  Qânûn provides  an  institutional
framework  both  for  the  state  and  Dâr  al-Salâm,  but  when  it  comes  to  choosing  an
applicable norm and procedure, the general pattern seems to be mostly guided by the
demands of the parties and the need to maintain peace and order. Order comes first; law
is secondary. 
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NOTES
1.  For a thorough account of Yemen’s recent history, see Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
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2.  Although I do not see “the state” as a monolithic bloc, I refer to it in this article as a distinct
actor which strives to impose its constitutional order through official mechanisms.
3.  I  understand “civil  society”  here as  the re-formation of  individuals  and social  fields  into
societal organisations and interest groups under the framework of a modern nation-state. For a
thorough analysis of civil society in Yemen, see Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen. The Political
Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
4.  For the purposes of this article, I see the differences between the two predominantly in the
conditions for participation: tribal society requires kinship affiliation or a protection agreement,
civil society requires citizenship.
5.  Since mid-2003, however, Dâr al-Salâm has moved to new premises in order to be more visible
and easier to reach. It is now housed – symbolically as well? – in the former building of a primary
court in Sancâ’.
6.  Dresch  refers  to  earlier  attempts  to  organise  tribal  mediation,  for  instance  at  the  tribal
conferences of cAmrân (1963) and Khamîr (1965). See Paul Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History
in Yemen. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989:251.
7.  According  to  lawyer  and  MP  Muhammad  Najî  cAlâw,  there  are  other  judges  who  rule
according to curf in court, despite the fact that the Law of Procedure prohibits this (Al-Wasat 12
February 2001).
8.  My thanks to Iris Glosemeyer for providing me with his CV.
9.  Others informed me that he had studied these subjects at the Police Academy (machad al-shurta
).
10.  Although here Al-Marwanî uses the term muhâmin (advocate, lawyer), in fact he is a wakîl al-
sharîca, a “representative of sharîca” who also assists litigants in court, but is not accredited as a
professional lawyer. The muhâmin did not exist under classical sharîca,  and was only recently
legitimised by the Law of Advocacy 30/1992. The controversial position of the wakîl al-sharîca was
eventually forbidden by this Law (Art. 87).
11.  Note the compound construction of “al-qâdîcurf”.
12.  On my return to Yemen in July 2003, I was told that these awareness campaigns had become
the most important activity of Dâr al-Salâm.
13.  One wonders why. In tribal circles especially, written agreements with the signatures of all
parties are extremely important to set out the territorial and legal boundaries and modes of
conduct between tribes, tribal members and third parties. On the other hand, Al-Marwanî had
made several efforts to register Dâr al-Salâm as an NGO at the Ministry of Culture from 1998
onwards. During my last visit in July 2003, he showed me that this registration had finally been
accomplished.
14.  See the initial leaflet of Dâr al-Salâm (English and Arabic version), and the English weekly
Yemen Times, 12–18 July 1999:4. The Arabic leaflet mentions the names of 34 shaykhs, 22 judges,
nine Islamic scholars, eight lawyers, and 20 others of miscellaneous background. No reference is
made to female members, but I have met with some women lawyers who confirmed their (ad hoc)
participation. The figures were, however, not verifiable. The newspaper Al-Mar’a, for instance,
mentions 170 tribal shaykhs, 70 judges, 40 lawyers, 12 prosecutors and a few others (Al-Mar’a, 39,
July/August 1999:3).
15.  Al-Marwanî declared in personal interviews and also in the press that he did not receive any
money from the government, but that they have a common objective, namely, to put a halt to
tribal  blood  disputes.  Al-Ra’y,16  November  1999:7,  and  Al-Wahda,  26  January  2000:14.  It  does
occur, therefore, that the President calls upon Dâr al-Salâm for paid arbitration, as is discussed
later.
16.  He often uses phrases like “relieving the psychological impact of hate and fighting between
people”, and “people need to recuperate their sense of tolerance, peace and love for each other”
by abandoning “destructive practices  such as  blood revenge”,  to which end “the good tribal
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customs  need  to  be  revived”.  See  for  instance  Al-Balâgh,  26  January  1999,  Al-Nahâr,  20  May
2000:26, and Al-Marwanî’s CV.
17.  To name but a few initiatives in1998: the initiation of a judicial reform programme by the
Ministry  of  Justice  (in  cooperation  with  international  donors),  the  nationalisation  of  private
Islamic madrasas (schools) by the Ministry of Education, the launch of the popular legal journal
Al-Qistâs by the Sancânî NGO Forum for Civil Society, and the Ministry of Justice’s immediate
response in relaunching its official legal journal, Al-Majalla al-Qadâ’iyya, after a break of twenty
years.
18.  Some  Yemenis,  however,  believe  that  in  order  to  maintain  his  authority,  the  Imâm
occasionally reconciled himself to the reality of legal pluralism, and acquiesced in the application
of tribal law in certain jurisdictions and regions, but only insofar as it would not “permit what
was  forbidden,  or  forbid  what  was  permitted”.  See,  however,  Dresch  1989:183–188.  Certain
instruments  used  by  the  Imâm  to  contain  such  practices  were,  for  instance,  his  ikhtiyârât
(choices), imamic legal opinions based on ijtihâd (independent legal reasoning), which he made
binding on the courts. Messick 1993:211–212, and Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: The
Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkânî. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003:202–206. I hope to
provide more substantiation to this argument in my Ph.D. thesis.
19.  For instance, Sûras 2:256; 4:51; 4:60; 4:76; 5:60; 16:36; 39:17.
20.  Other objectives, such as providing legal representation in court for women and deprived
people, and releasing “overdue” prisoners (those who have fulfilled their term in jail, but cannot
afford to pay their outstanding blood money) fall outside the scope of this article. Al-Thawra, 8
February, 2000; Yemen Times, 12–18 July 1999:4.
21.  Bakîl  is  one  of  the  three  large  tribal  confederations  in  Upper  Yemen,  the  others  being
Hâshid, and the less-known Madhhij.
22.  Interview 2 May 2001. The first legal codes of North Yemen in the 1970s were derived from
sharîca and were called “al-qawânîn al-islamiyya”, the Islamic codes.
23.  A noted exception are the so-called Qawâcid al-Sabcîn (The Rules of the Seventy [Men], or The
Seventy Rules), containing the agreed customary rules among the tribes of Jabal Barat, northern
Yemen. Dresch is presently preparing an annotated translation of these written rules. See also
his Tribes: 58, 128, 149–150, 352–53.
24.  Compare  Messick’s  discussion  of  “closing  texts”,  in  which  he  describes  the  codification
process of sharîca (Messick 1993:54ff.)
25.  Shelagh Weir is currently finalising a book on the maintenance of tribal order in north-west
Yemen.
26.  Article 3 of the Yemeni Constitution of 1994 reads: “The Islamic sharîca is the source of all
legislation.”
27.  This  term  was  introduced  by  Léon  Buskens  in  “ An  Islamic  Triangle.  ChangingRelationships
between Sharî ca,  State  Law,  and  Local  Customs”,  ISIM  Newsletter  5,  2000:8  (see  also  on
www.isim.nl).
28.  Dupret  calls  this  the use of  “normative repertoires”.  Baudouin Dupret,  “Legal  Pluralism,
Normative Plurality, and the Arab World”, in Baudouin Dupret, Maurits Berger, Laila al-Zwaini
(eds), Legal Pluralism in the Arab World. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999:29–40 (34–36).
29.  Here he blends a human rights idiom with an Islamic idiom.
30.  Al-Balâgh, 26 January 1999:3.
31.  Al-Nahâr, 20 May 2000:26.
32. Al-Balâgh, 23 May 2000; Al-Sahwa (the newspaper of the Islâh party), 7 September 2000.  
33. Yemen Times, 12–18 July 1999:4; Al-Mîthâq, 1 November 1999:12. The Law of Arbitration (1992,
amended in 1997) does however specify some limitations on arbitration; see below for a brief
discussion.
34.  Al-Balâgh, 27 January 1999:3.
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35.  Article 3, discussed below.
36.  In Arabic:  “dâr qadâ’îyya ikhtiyâriyya tadummu niqâbat  min kibâr  al-culamâ’  wa-l-qudâh wa-l-
mashâyikh  li-hall  mukhtalif  al-munâzacât  bî-turuq  al-tawfîq  wa-ltahkîm  wa-taqdîm  al-fatwâ  wa-l-
istishârât al-qânûnîyya. tahkîm madanî-curfî.”
37.  In Arabic: “dâr qadâ’iyya ikhtîyâriyya li-hall mukhtalif al-munâzacât al-sharciyya, al-qânûniyya wa-
l-curfiyya  wa-qismat  al-mawârîth  wa-tawthîq  al-cuqûd  wa-l-fatwâ  wa-l-istishârât  al-qânûniyya  wa-l-
muhâmâh. tahkîm tijârî-madanî-curfî-watanî-duwalî.”
38.  Note the peculiar Arabic. Their own translation reads: Assalam House Social for Arbitration
(note the peculiar English). Sometimes “Assalam” is presented as a name, sometimes with the
meaning of “peace”.
39.  Interview, 24 April 2001.
40.  In Arabic:  “yadummu al-dâr  nukhba min kibâr  al-culamâ’  wa-l-qudâh wa-lmashâyikh wa-acdhâ’
majlis  al-nuwwâb  wa-l-istishârî  li-l-hadd  min  qadâyâ  al-tha’r  wa-l-fasl  fî  munâzacât.  hay’a  shacbiyya
mustaqilla.”
41.  In Arabic: “al-majlis al-aclâ li-mukâfahat al-tha’r wa-l-cunf wa-nashr thaqâfat altasâmuh.”
42.  I have a copy of their proposal, but no detailed information on the actual implementation.
43. Al-Balâgh, 9 January 2001, and also Al-Wahda, 3 January 2001.
44. Al-Wahda, 26 January 2000:14. It remains unclear whether the President or the government
actually gave money to Dâr al-Salâm, other than in return for a requested arbitration.
45.  Copy in my possession. See also al-Thawra, 8 February 2000.
46.  One  case  reported  40  million  Yemeni  riyâl  (about  300,000)  as  compensation  for  its
settlement. Such exceptional amounts result from the tribal practice of multiplying the “normal”
Islamic diya by four, eleven, or even 44 times, depending on the gravity of the offence (see also
section 5).
47.  This  was,  of course,  not  verifiable.  Al-Ra’y,16  November  1999:7;  Al-Wahda,  26  January
2000:14.
48.  Al-Mîthâq, 1 November 1999, 12; Al-Nahâr, 20 May 2000, p. 28; Al-Shûra, 18 February 2001:3.
49.  Because of lack of official statutes, information on the organisational structure of Dâr al-
Salâm was gathered from several interviews in April–May 2001, from the newspaper Al-Balâgh, 26
January 1999, and from a leaflet from Dâr al-Salâm.
50.  This remarkable information could probably shed a new light on our understanding of Dâr
al-Salâm, but at this point my interview was abruptly interrupted by gunfire outside the house.
Sinân’s uncle, on his way home, had fallen into an ambush that was an act of blood revenge.
Sinân excused himself  in order to attempt mediation. As a woman, I  could not attend. Upon
leaving the house, there were several dead bodies lying in the street, of innocent passers-by (the
uncle  had  survived).  The  interview  was  never  completed.  This  incident  shows  that  the
implications of blood revenge are not confined to tribal areas or even tribal members, but can
also affect city dwellers in a most intrusive manner.
51.  Gabrielle  von Bruck has written extensively  about the Zaydî  sayyids and their  changing
status. See for instance her “Disputing Descent-Based Authority in the Idiom of Religion: The
Case of the Republic of Yemen”, Die Welt des Islams, 38, 2, 1998:149–191 (153).
52.  Law 22/1992, Article 53 sub g, and 55 sub b.
53.  Al-Balâgh, 27 January 1999, 3.
54.  Al-Nahâr, 20 May 2000.
55.  Interview, 2 May 2001.
56.  “Here is Dâr al-Salâm, specialised in blood revenge.”
57.  Al-Nahâr, 20 May 2000:26.
58.  Law 22/1992, Articles 15–16.
59.  On  tribal  settlements  and  their  procedures,  see  various  excellent  studies  of  Robert  B.
Serjeant,  for  instance,  “South  Arabia”,  in  Commoners,  Climbers,  and  Notables,  C.A.O.  van
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Nieuwenhuijze (ed.). Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977:226–247. Also Dresch 1989: passim, and a case study
in his “Episodes in a dispute between Yemeni tribes: text and translation of a colloquial Arabic
document”, Der Islam, 64 (1987):68–86.
60. The Encyclopedia of Yemen (EY), 2nd edition, 2003, mentions a modernised version of “tha’r”
which consists of taking fake claims to the courts or police with the intention of causing trouble
and nuisance for the victim, because procedures normally take an inordinately long time and
rights are often not protected.
61.  A mu’min here means an individual associated with a tribe not by kinship affiliation, but by a
protection agreement.
62.  This is a tribal augmentation of the diya that is originally prescribed by sharîca. Depending on
the type and gravity of the offence, and the curf of the tribe, the Islamic diya is either quadrupled
or “elevenished”.
63.  This decision was also published in Al-Balâgh,  23 March 1999. Photos shown to me by Al-
Marwanî present the two tribes and their mediators during the recitation of a zâmil-verse, while
another portrays two shaykhs flanked by two armed men, signing the sulh document at a table
inside a house,  while huge stacks of money are piled at their feet.  In the full  version of the
complex,  handwritten sulh document,  we also come across an incident in which an Egyptian
teacher was killed in the chain of tha’r revenges,  because “his” tribe had killed the Egyptian
teacher of the other tribe. My thanks to Baudouin Dupret for providing me with a better copy of
this sulh.
64.  Interview, 2 May 2001.
65.  This number was related to me by Abduljalîl  and several other informants.  However, Al-
Balâgh (7  September  1999)  mentions  “more  than  200”  tribesmen,  even  though  it  was  also
Abduljalîl who gave the interview. See also Al-Shûra, 5 September 1999.
66.  Shaykh Al-Ajdac in a report to Al-Shûra, 27 June 1999, and Al-Wahdawî, 3 August 1999. We
never come to know whether these settlements are final. I venture to say that they are usually
not, despite all guarantees and influential interventions.
67.  The reported successes in the first year of its existence were: 31 tha’r-cases (52, according to
Al-Ra’y,  16  November  1999);  60  civil  cases  by  arbitration,  free  legal  aid  in  50  cases,  and  39
prisoners set free after completion of their legal detention (AlMar’a, 39 July–August 1999; Al-Ra’y
al-cÂmm, 29 June 1999).
68.  This Commission was created in 1975 to draft laws by selecting those sharîca principles from
various schools of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) that were closest to the spirit of the century and
the specific Yemeni context.
69.  In Arabic: “al-aslâf wa-l-acrâf lahâ hukmuhâ wa-yurâcî fîhâ haqn al-damâ’ wa hasm al-khilâf.” See
also Articles 4 and 6.
70.  Article 45, Law 32/1997.
71.  Article 53 sub g and 55 sub b, Law 22/1992.
INDEX
Mots-clés : coutume, Yémen
Mediating between custom and code




International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), Leyde
Mediating between custom and code
Égypte/Monde arabe, 1 | 2005
24
